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In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay, by Timothy
Pawl. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xii + 250. $90 (hardcover).
JC BEALL, University of Notre Dame
This is Book 2 of Timothy Pawl’s entirely defensive project against
would-be objections to Conciliar Christology (i.e., the theory containing
all claims about Christ asserted in the first seven ecumenical councils) and
some of its possible extensions (i.e., theories that include all of Conciliar
Christology but also contain extra-conciliar Christological claims). The canvassed extensions are theories that affirm either the possibility of multiple
incarnations (chs. 2–3), Christ’s descent into hell (ch. 4), Christ’s free will
(ch. 5), that God incarnate was omniscient (chs. 7–8), or that the God-Man
(viz., Christ) was both peccable and impeccable (ch. 6). In each case Pawl’s
aim is to show that would-be charges of contradiction can be met either by
metaphysical constructs or by switching the standard semantics of terms.
Pawl’s Book 2, like his Book 1 (viz., In Defense of Conciliar Christology
(Oxford University Press, 2016)), is good—hands down. It is also exemplary in many ways: it champions and exhibits clarity; it champions and
exhibits argument; it champions and exhibits history. Pawl’s entire discussion of the “extended topics” (e.g., multiple incarnations, etc.) makes for
fascinating reading, not only for the expert but, remarkably, for non-experts: it provides a very useful entry into the given topics.
This review, for word-limit reasons, focuses chiefly on Pawl’s ch. 6
response to the apparent contradiction involving Christ’s being peccable
(because human) but equally impeccable (because divine). (This sort of
Pawline response shows up elsewhere too, and so, e.g., my comments
apply equally to Pawl’s ch. 3, §II.b.3 reply to multiple incarnations.) But
let me be clear: Book 2 is chockablock with interesting ideas, arguments,
and implicit methodological principles that go vastly beyond the target
of my substantive comments. Towards giving at least a tiny sense of the
vast breadth of Pawl’s discussion I turn first to a rapid march through the
main topics of the chapters before turning to my substantive discussion of
a common idea that bridges Pawl’s Books 1 and 2 (viz., Pawl’s solution to
the so-called fundamental problem).
A march through Pawl’s chapters: Pawl’s Chapter 1 of Book 2 is a rehearsal
of his Conciliar Christology (definitions, background assumptions, etc.).
One can read and profit from Book 2 by reading Chapter 1 forward,
although my guess (and recommendation) is that first reading Book 1
makes for a richer engagement with Book 2. (It’s not necessary for understanding Book 2; it’s just useful and valuable background.)
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The second chapter presents a variety of theses concerning the possibility of multiple incarnations of God. The aim of the chapter is to distinguish four theses concerning multiple incarnations, each one endorsed by
Aquinas according to Pawl.
Pawl’s Chapter 3 restarts the driving defensive project. This chapter
defends against seven different charges of contradiction arising from
target extensions of Conciliar Christology and the various Chapter-2reviewed theses concerning multiple incarnations. Pawl argues that none
of the objections establish their target contradiction.
Chapter 4 considers a would-be objection against the extension of
Conciliar Christology with the thesis that Christ descended into Hell
during the three-day death. With characteristic detail Pawl spells out the
would-be objection and then goes through six different defenses, some of
which Pawl thinks may be more viable than others.
Pawl’s Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 make up the second (of three) parts of
Book 2, this one focusing on Conciliar Christology’s commitment to the
thesis that Christ has two wills. Chapter 5 defends against alleged contradiction in the freedom of Christ’s two wills; Chapter 6 defends against
alleged contradiction in Christ’s being impeccable (i.e., the impossibility of
willing or otherwise doing anything sinful). (It is Chapter 6 that, together
with some discussion in Chapter 3, reflects the one firm thesis that Pawl
advances in both books, namely, what has come to be called the Pawline
solution to the so-called fundamental problem (more on which below); and
it is this topic on which the substantive bulk of my review focuses after this
march through the vast breadth of topics discussed by Pawl’s Book 2.) As
with previous chapters, Pawl carefully lays out the target objections and
proceeds to argue that they fail to establish the target contradiction.
Part 3, the final part, contains two chapters that concern Christ’s knowledge. These chapters focus on would-be contradictions facing extensions
of Pawl’s Conciliar Christology with theses about Christ’s knowledge,
including foreknowledge. In both chapters Pawl lays out the would-be
charge(s) of contradiction and argues that the objections fail.
The foregoing rapid review of Pawl’s chapters makes plain the breadth
of Book 2. Each chapter is rich with ideas and arguments, and is valuable even for those without a commitment to Pawl’s Conciliar Christology,
though certainly especially valuable for anyone committed to standard
orthodox theology constrained at least by First Chalcedon.
When, as in the case of Pawl’s book, one is faced with a vast number of
interesting arguments but a tiny word count, one must make a decision:
give superficial comments on a handful of topics or dive into at least one.
I take the latter route in what remains of this review, focusing on the common commitment between Books 1 and 2, namely, the Pawline approach
to the fundamental problem of Christology.
Some substantive comments: The so-called fundamental problem of
Christology—the central problem of Pawl’s Book 1—involves a simple-tostate question: How can Christ have the (apparently contrary) properties
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that Chalcedon—and a fortiori Conciliar Christology—claims? (Properties
are contraries, on my usage, if and only if their joint exemplification entails a
contradiction.) An instance of the problem is taken up in Pawl’s Chapter 6,
where the target properties are peccability and impeccability. The problem,
in this case, is that on standard usage “peccable” and “impeccable” are contrary predicates: they’re jointly satisfied by an object only if there’s some contradiction true of the object. What is Pawl’s response? Embracing (for what
reason?) the standard account of logical consequence, Pawl rejects the salient possibility that Christ is a contradictory being—a being of whom some
contradiction is true (some claim of the form it is true that p and it is false that
p). Instead, Pawl’s project is part of the dominant quest to “consistentize”
Christ—to give a consistent account of Christ. Pawl’s particular strategy, as
I illustrate below, is a change-the-meaning strategy: reject the standard meanings of “peccable” and “impeccable” and invoke non-standard meanings.
Any change-the-meaning strategy faces a variety of familiar issues.
One of them is whether the resulting theory is still focused on its target
object—in the case at hand, Christ. And here Pawl’s account is wanting.
Focus on the properties at hand: peccability and impeccability.
Standard usage:
x is peccable if and only if x is able to sin.
x is impeccable if and only if it’s false that x is peccable. (cf. 155)
As Pawl observes (155), a theory of Christ according to which Christ is
peccable and impeccable—as the terms are standardly used—is contradictory: it’s true that Christ is peccable and it’s false that Christ is peccable.
The Pawline proposal, being part of the dominant quest to consistentize
Christ, points to a different theory from the given contradictory one, one
in which *-peccability (pronounced star-peccability) and *-impeccability
(star-impeccability) are central. (Note well: Pawl does not explicitly use
“stars” but they’re useful for keeping track of what’s going on.) The star
predicates express properties that, depending on the account of “has” in
“has a concrete nature” (22–31), differ from their starless cousins:
Star-studded usage:
x is *-peccable iff x has a concrete nature which is peccable.
x is *-impeccable iff x has a concrete nature which is impeccable.
Note very well: Pawl’s ultimate proposal (155ff.) is more complicated
than the one-starred route above, but the one-starred account is enough
for present purposes.
Recall the fundamental question: Can Christ be both peccable and impeccable? Pawl’s answer is ultimately negative: Christ cannot be peccable and
impeccable (any more than Christ can be mutable and immutable, passible
and impassible, etc.); instead, Christ can be *-peccable and *-impeccable
(likewise, *-mutable and *-immutable, *-passable and *-impassible, etc.).
But hold on: there are no explicit star predicates in the conciliar texts! When
such texts say that Christ is (e.g.) mutable and immutable (so, extrapolating,
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peccable and impeccable) they say it just so—full stop, no stars appearing.
What to say? Pawl’s response, as I understand it, is that the true theory of
Christ is one according to which Christ counts as peccable and impeccable (without stars, so to speak) only by charity: it’s not really Christ who
is the fundamental bearer of these properties; it’s the various “concrete
natures” that fundamentally bear those properties, and not one of those
beings is identical to Christ (on pain of contradiction). Christ exemplifies
*-peccability (etc.) at best; he is not the primary or genuine bearer of our
human peccability or God’s divine impeccability. Objects very different
from Christ individually bear the awesome weight of our peccability and
God’s impeccability.
Has Pawl given a recipe for achieving a consistent theory according to
which Christ is peccable and impeccable? No. Can Pawl’s recipe achieve
a consistent theory according to which Christ is *-peccable and *-impeccable? Undoubtedly. But will the resulting theory ever be one in which
Christ is the fundamental (versus the derivative or by-charity) bearer of
the target properties? No. And in this way Pawl’s program strikes me
as wanting: it clings to consistency at the cost of taking the spotlight off
of Christ, by simply conceding the fundamental-problem objection at
the get-go: namely, that Christ does not have the target properties that
Chalcedon-constrained Christologies have long attributed to Christ—just
as Pawl’s target objectors have long claimed.
A similar point can be seen by reflecting on the role of “concrete natures”
in Pawl’s meaning-change account. Pawl’s basic theory of Christ is compositional even if, per conciliar demands, the hypostatic union cannot be
fully understood (fully analyzed, explicated) only in terms of parthood.
(According to Conciliar Christology, the hypostatic union can’t be fully
understood—analyzed, explicated, etc.—full stop. This obviously doesn’t
preclude systematic but partial understanding.) To get a sense of the target
problem consider an example from outside of Christology:
x *-wiggles iff x has a part that wiggles.
My pinky just wiggled, and so I have a part that wiggled, and so I *-wiggled even though I didn’t wiggle; so *-wiggling is insufficient for wiggling.
Now, our driving question (let’s suppose) is whether I can wiggle. You
point out that I can *-wiggle. But so what? Talking about my *-wiggling
seems to be of little relevance to our driving question unless, of course, my
pinky (or any other of my wiggling proper parts) is a representative part of
me in the following sense:
Definition: x is a representative part of S iff x is a part of S, and for any
(relevant) predicate G, if G is true of x then G is true of S.
(Side note: what does “relevant” pick out here? Any compositional account
usually invokes some notion of relevant properties if it wishes to avoid contradictions that quickly arise from, e.g., “x is a proper part of S” and “S is
an improper part of S.” (By x’s being representative, S is thereby a proper
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part of S. Contradiction, given normal definitions.) I leave the charting
of relevant properties to others who, like Pawl, try to consistentize Christ
via compositional accounts, even where “part” is used, as per Pawl, in its
widest and most general sense. End side note.)
With representative parts comes a different star predicate:
x **-wiggles if and only if x has a representative part that wiggles.
In this case, it’s obvious why we’re looking to a given (representative)
part when our concern is in fact the main subject of those parts: we are
looking at x’s representative parts because we care about whether x itself
wiggles. And on the doubly starred account **-wiggling is sufficient for
wiggling (via the part-to-Subject principle that derives from the account
of representative parts).
Enough wiggling. The same question arises for Pawl’s general program:
Why are we focusing on these so-called concrete natures? Why those parts
(understood, once again, in the broadest sense of “parts”)? Presumably,
the answer is that they’re representative parts.
But now trouble: if Christ’s “concrete natures” are representative parts
and Christ is both *-peccable and *-impeccable (per above) then we appear
to be back at inconsistency. Since concrete natures are representative parts
of Christ, and Christ is both *-peccable and *-impeccable, Christ thereby
has both of the target properties of said concrete natures—in this case,
being able to sin and being unable to sin. And that looks to be just the fundamental contradiction we started with—the one that Pawl’s stars were
supposed to resolve.
Pawl’s program looks like it faces a simple dilemma: either “concrete natures” in Pawl’s nonstandard semantics are representative parts
(per above) or not. If so, the fundamental contradiction seems not to be
avoided because even though each such “concrete nature” has exactly
one of the two contrary properties (viz., being able to sin, being unable to
sin) Christ winds up with both—contradiction. On the other horn, if the
concrete natures aren’t representative parts then there’s no reason to care
whether they are peccable or impeccable; the driving concern is whether,
as Chalcedon plainly says of other property pairs, Christ is peccable and
impeccable. As far as I can see, looking at non-representative parts to
answer whether Christ is both able to sin and unable to sin is analogous
to looking at my pinky’s wiggling to determine whether I am wiggling.
There mightn’t be any contradiction, but it’s far from clear why we’re discussing the matter given our driving question.
Probably I have blundered somewhere, and quite probably the fault
lies with me and not Pawl’s work. But even if I did blunder somewhere,
there’s reason to think that a Chalcedon-constrained Christology (a fortiori, Conciliar Christology) should accept that Christ is both able to sin
and unable to sin—and not just that Christ is *-peccable and *-impeccable,
as Pawl affirms. The reason stems from Chalcedon’s clear and unmistakable balance of the human and divine natures. As Oliver Crisp discusses
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(God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology (T&T Clark, 2009)), the desideratum is to find balance between Christ’s divine and human natures,
whether it be with the usual Chalcedon-affirmed pairs of properties or
the pair on the table (viz., peccability and impeccability). Those on the
quest to consistentize Christ rightly seek perfect balance but, in the end,
tilt to a “Christology from below,” favoring the human nature, or tilt to
a “Christology from above,” favoring the divine nature. Many wind up
rejecting that Christ is able to sin because, for various reasons, they think
that this takes away from Christ’s divinity—which is by all accounts
wholly good. To regain footing, those questing after a consistent but perfectly balanced Christ invoke a well-worn “qua” device with reduplicative
flavor, even if officially they explicitly reject QUA “solutions” to the apparent contradiction of Christ. In Pawl’s particular case, the words “peccable”
and “impeccable” (strictly speaking, some star-studded variation of those
predicates) are applied to Christ, and in this way outward tribute is paid
to Chalcedon. But unless I’m missing something, the predicates “is able
to sin” and “is unable to sin” are not both true of Christ on the given
accounts; they’re true of very different beings, not Christ. But those predicates were precisely the original question! Despite the stars, Pawl seems
to reject that our main-concern predicates (viz., “able to sin” and “unable
to sin”) are both true of Christ. In this way, Pawl fails to achieve the pure
balance of divinity and humanity that Chalcedon so strongly appears to
affirm and that, one would think, Conciliar Christology should embrace.
Before closing I flag some hope. Is there a natural consistentization of
Christ on which Christ is both able to sin and unable (i.e., not able) to
sin? Instead of changing the meanings of the words to eke out consistency
(cf. Sarah Coakley, “What Chalcedon Solved and Didn’t Solve,” in The
Incarnation, ed. S. T. Davis et al. (Oxford University Press, 2002)), a more
promising route is to recognize different—but entirely standard—modalities involved in the Chalcedon-constrained affirmations, one modality
tied to the divine and one to the human. The fundamental-problem contradiction is avoided because the conciliar attributions (e.g., “able to sin”
and “unable to sin,” etc.) involve different modalities—one governed by
Christ’s human nature, one by Christ’s divine nature. This sort of account
towards consistentizing Christ is simple but promising (for the given project). But details are for another venue.
I close by repeating a claim at the front: Pawl’s Book 2 is a valuable contribution to the ongoing (and, alas, dominant) quest to consistentize Christ. My
own view is that the quest for a true and consistent account of Christ is likely
to come up short; however, the tools, terrain, and problems produced from
the quest are invaluable in the pursuit of the true Christology. And from this
perspective, Pawl’s Book 2, like its predecessor, is tremendously high-yield.

